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CORRESPONDENCE
The FORDHAmt LAW REVIEW is pleased to publish correspondence which it
considers interesting to its readers, but without implication that it accepts or
rejects the contentions therein expressed.

To THE EDITOR OF THE FORDHA.

LAW REVIEW:

I trust that I may be permitted to impose upon your long suffering columns once
more to answer the question that Professor Kennedy puts to me in his latest article.
He asks' whether I deny that I said (or believe) that "jurisprudence is transcendental nonsense." In answer I must say that I do deny ever having said or believed
2
that. I did point out, in my original article, that certain traditional premises, which
I reject, lead to the conclusion that jurisprudence is transcendental nonsense. I do
not accept the conclusion any more than the premises. My own belief is that jurisprudence is a scientific discipline that deals with the observable conduct of courts.
Incidentally, the notion that legal concepts are supernatural entities, which Professor
Kennedy, in his second article,3 accuses me of holding, is likewise an opinion which
I stated not as my own view but as one of the "basic assumptions of traditional legal
theory"4 which I reject. My own view is that legal concepts are not supernatural
at all but are real elements in actual cases.
It is regretable that my respected critic, in both his articles, should proceed by
ascribing to me the basic assumptions that I attack and then discovering, naturally
enough, that the result doesn't make sense. It is doubly regrettable because this
procedure has obscured the real issue, which ishow far the methods of science-methods of logical analysis, observation, statistical calculations, etc.-are applicable
to the field of law. On that issue I shall look forward with eagerness to the
5
further statement of his views that Professor Kennedy promises.
Washington, D. C.

FELIX S. COHEN.
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